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Abstract: This paper proposes to augment the concept of a business resilience improving process
by enlarging such a process with a dimension of external action that addresses the vaster frame of
systemic resilience of our societies. To this aim, I propose to widen the concept of socio-technical
system (STS) to human societies, based on the idea that the development and survival of human
societies has necessary social and technical factors. I also propose a concept of resilience in terms
of dealing with failures of STS. Two particular cases of very large failure avoidance are considered:
nuclear war and civilizational collapse, and I propose that such cases should be present in the
referred dimension of external action of any business resilience program. Because the action of public
governments and their cooperation is crucial for advancing global systemic resilience, I suggest that
businesses should analyze and model the decisions of governments in a wider context of naturally
occurring cooperating and conflicting human groups.
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1. Introduction
In [1], Katrin Muff (dean of the Business School of Lausanne) questions the perspective that looks
at “business resilience” as if it could be meaningfully separated from the vaster problem of systemic
resilience of human societies in global terms:
“Shouldn’t business care about the resilience of the larger system (the planet and our societies) first,
rather than focusing on the survival of a sub-system (business)?”
This dimension of the subject should be taken in consideration in a comprehensive theory of
business resilience. Businesses (as we understood them actually) are a form of organization in modern
civilization. While there are increasing concerns, initiatives and results in business resilience, the fact
remains that the very existence of businesses is bound to the civilization (the system) of which they are
organizations (subsystems).
Any theory of individual business resilience must assume that civilization will be resilient enough
to sustain itself. Civilization resilience is a necessary condition for business resilience. Without
civilization, theories of business resilience are futile because there are no businesses. This means that
a theory of business resilience must connect to a theory of civilizational resilience in order to have
practically meaningful foundations. It is at least prudent to assess the resilience of the “larger system” if
one wants a theory of business resilience centered at the “business” or subsystem level that makes sense.
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A deeper reason to include or connect to a theory of civilization resilience in a theory of business
resilience is that both cannot be disjoint because businesses are subsystems of the wider system.
The policies (or their absence) to make civilization resilient have consequences for the design of
business resilience. This becomes evident when one considers the fundamental resilience any business
can have: solvency or bottom-line resilience. It is illustrated as a thought experiment [2] as follows.
Imagine that one has the responsibility of top level decision in a business that has just come to
the green in terms of bottom-line: sales revenues equal the required payments and savings. If this
is the case, the business should have been performing structurally and functionally well in a viable
environment. The next concern for management is to keep the business in such a good condition.
The question is what could move the business into negative results territory. Posing this question
means that decision-makers begin a “bottom-line business resilience process”.
There are two factors to consider and address in this process, one internal and the other external.
The internal factor is the organizational and behavioral performance of the business as a business.
This can be addressed by establishing an adaptive performance measure consistent with being actually
in the green and define a sub-process to maintain and increase performance.
The external factor is demand for the products sold by the business. While it may be quite difficult
to master the first factor, the (external) propensity of buyers to buy the business products overplays it.
The best performing organization will not make business acting in an environment where buyers of its
products do not exist.
This means exactly that there must exist people with interest in the business products and able to
pay their fair prices. Maintaining comfortable constant demand or experiencing comfortably increasing
demand appears as an optimal environmental condition. This external factor can be addressed
establishing a second sub-process inside the resilience process to monitor demand and influence it,
if possible.
A prosperous, healthy and wealthy environment will generate a maximum of demand compatible
with the environment’s resources. This is the systemic property of the environment that maximizes the
bottom-line resilience of businesses with respect to demand. Therefore, it must be the target for the
sub-process that addresses demand when trying to influence it.
As I will argue in the sequel, the systemic property of prosperity is necessary for civilizational
resilience. This global systemic resilience property fuses with the local target of each business towards
being bottom line resilient.
One must add to prosperity clean energy and peace to get a resilient civilization. War is not good
for business, except for those in the business of war. However, even to these, prosperity and peace can
be a very interesting proposal in bottom-line terms if seen as enabling businesses of a transformed
kind, as I will suggest.
To sum up, as this thought experiment shows, bottom-line business resilience requires
two processes, one to address business performance, the other to address demand for the business
products. The targets for the last one align with civilizational resilience targets. What is good for
civilization is good for business and vice-versa.
The purpose of this paper is to bring clarification on the external and global systemic dimension
of business resilience, to chart some obvious needs and to elicit moves that businesses can take to “care
about the resilience of the larger system” as part of the process of increasing business resilience.
The cornerstone of the development is two-fold and presented in Section 2. I propose to widen
the concept of socio-technical system (STS) to human societies, based on the idea that the development
and survival of human societies has necessary social and technical factors. I will consider the global
or planetary civilization an STS—the widest system, or the global STS. Subsystems of the global
STS will be, among others, states. A state will be an STS with a terrestrial surface area where it has
jurisdiction, nominally at least. Given the flexibility of the system’s concept one can also take as an
STS any meaningful subsystem as a region or an organization.
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I also propose a concept of resilience as the general function of an STS that deals with its own
failures. I conclude that we can distinguish three basic functions in systemic resilience: prediction,
counter-measures and information gathering. I take in account that these functions are to be
implemented inside a system that is complex by nature.
Two or three basic types of human organizations will implement these functions. These types
are public and private, the last one being further divided with the usual labels of non-profit and
business. Therefore, the actions of organizations, both public and private, will determine which
systemic resilience will exist.
Under the presented sketch of a theory of meta-organizing of organizations into a set of state
STSs, a government has a key role in the coordination of the organizations operating in its jurisdiction
area, conditioning business survival and reproduction through the monetary coordination mechanism,
for which I present some key ideas. The role of governments in the coordination, which occurs in
their jurisdictions, conditions businesses and their resilience. From the standpoint of businesses, the
function of a government is to enact prosperity in its jurisdiction and contribute to global prosperity.
Even before caring for global resilience, economic prosperity must be shown to possible in order to
guide governments’ decisions. I propose that prosperity may be operationally understood as a society
satisfying a quality standard.
In Section 3, I look at business resilience from the standpoint of businesses being subsystems of
a socio-technical system and I restate the idea—put forth above—that a business process targeting
business resilience should have two sub-processes, one addressing internal factors of failure, the other
addressing external factors or threats.
Among the multiple external threats that businesses may face I choose to consider with some detail
two that have a top-level character: nuclear war and civilization collapse by economic stratification
and resource depletion. A nuclear war would collapse civilization at the fastest pace that one could
imagine, so it is in this sense the “greatest threat” to consider. A recent study [3] observed that resource
depletion and economic stratification are two factors ever present in the collapse of civilizations.
The importance of these threats may perhaps be better appreciated by assuming that if they were
not there, the global STS would appear, in practical terms, sustainable in a very 50plus20.org long
time frame.
The “top-level” character of these threats comes not only because they appear as the most
evident threats that menace the global STS and by consequence businesses, but also because the
counter-measures for them subsume external action of business towards resilience against more “local”
threats, as terrorist attacks, supply-chain disruption or, as above, insufficient demand.
In reflecting on counter-measures for such threats, it comes out that the decision-making of
governments is key in achieving the required global coordination for avoidance of the threats.
In the presented analysis, we point the following measures for each: redeploying military units
to more civilian missions required by STS, targeting minimal standards of life quality for societies
and investing in replacement of combustibles and carbon dioxide capture at a global scale. Therefore,
addressing these threats as external factors will require that businesses will influence and cooperate
with governments.
Systemic resilience of present STSs requires the existence of a dynamics in the international
network of states towards making first priority the goals of peace and civilization sustainability. Now,
the interesting question is why aren’t we there yet? Why aren’t public and private organizations
coordinating to stabilize resource depletion globally, or enhancing social cohesion? As scientists,
we have a special responsibility to search answers to this question, because science triggered the
civilizational burst we live in.
To understand how resilience can be realized or compromised we need a theory for the deviation
observed between the ideal and the observed behavior. A concept for such theory is considered in
Section 4. We immerge the three types of organizations in a broader network of groups along which
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human beings naturally coordinate behavior. It is the dynamics among these groups that determine
actual events.
A realist look at the network of groups that constitute societies shows that we should not expect
that all groups would cooperate to increase civilizational resilience. Some will do, some will not. For
the moment, the cooperation level has been enough, not only to avoid civilizational collapse, but also to
advance civilization. Yet, to achieve increased global STS resilience a wide and deeper understanding
of social dynamics and social power based on human group behavior must be attained. In this paper it
is only possible to point such need.
In Section 5, we sum up the exposition. Generalized cooperation among the organizations that
make up modern civilization or the global STS appears needed to counter the systemic threats of
nuclear war and civilizational collapse. It looks that we are lacking a theory on the subject, a theory
that would allow us to gather relevant data and assess the possibility of relevant action in increasing
cooperation towards economic prosperity, peace, minimum quality of life standards and sustainable
energy sources. Would such aims be attained, businesses and people in any organizations could
frame the future more confidently and a new perspective of business or organizational resilience
could emerge.
To end up this introductory section I would like to call the attention of the reader to an initiative
in management education that I comment briefly as a case study. See Box 1.
Case study: Is a new paradigm in business thinking emerging? The 50 + 20 collaborative initiative.
The proposals in this paper may seem at first far apart from current business management thinking. Yet they
are indeed quite aligned with the 50 + 20 initiative (50plus20.org). In their own words:
“50 + 20 is a collaborative initiative that seeks to learn of new ways and opportunities for management
education to transform and reinvent itself. We are asking critical questions about the state of the world, the
emerging societal issues, the dominant economic logic, the purpose of business, the crucial role of leadership,
and the challenges facing management education.”
The initiative puts together business leaders and academia, represented by several prestigious business
schools and technical universities A central concern of 50 + 20 is to contribute for a deep change in business
education, substituting a shareholder centered vision by a stakeholder centered vision and putting business
sustainability as the core goal of management among other issues.
In itself, 50 + 20 represents a significant quantum leap in business thinking towards more prosperous and
secure societies. As social evolution advances and problems of social and environmental nature become more
critical, it is to expect that this kind of change in business management thinking widely disseminates and its
“strangeness” will fade. It would be gratifying if this paper would become an instrumental contribution for
this change.
Box 1. A case study on emergent new business management thinking: the 50 + 20 initiative.
2. Resilience of Socio-Technical Systems
2.1. Human Societies Are STS
The concept of socio-technical system (STS) has gained increasing attention in the literature [4–9],
both in philosophical-conceptual [4–6] as in engineering terms [7–9]. The concept taken here for an STS
is a bit broader. One will take an STS as a system that has a necessary social component and a necessary
technical component. The social component means that in the system there are agents able to interact
among them. Moreover, this interaction, according to behavior coordinating patterns, is necessary for
the persistence in time and the development of the system. The technical component means that the
agents use recurrently technical artifacts in order to attain endeavors of them. A technical artifact is
understood as some object external to the agents’ bodies. Moreover, such use is also necessary for the
persistence in time and the development of the system.
This definition makes human groups, societies or even the whole human species socio-technical
systems where the abstract word “agents” means concretely “human beings”. Consider a human group
of hunter-gatherers. It makes an STS because it exhibits social behavioral patterns that if dissolved
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would lead to the dissolution of the group. Moreover, it makes an STS because the group uses a set of
technical artifacts (clothes, weapons, tools). If these would completely disappear without possibility of
replacement, the members of the group would be facing death in a short-term.
Our current situation is not different in qualitative terms from the pre-historic groups of
hunter-gatherers. Survival and development of our present days societies hinges both on behavioral
patterns of people as well as on the functioning, not only of technical artifacts, but also of whole
technical systems. A failure in the electrical power grid that would leave millions of people without
electricity for months would strongly disrupt either developed or developing countries, making a
disaster of size commensurate with the number of “millions” and the number of “months”. It is easy to
see that an area without electric power distribution for weeks should revert to pre-electrical technology.
The carrying capacity of the area—imagine a dense populated city—could be suddenly exceeded and
millions of people would see themselves as the hunter-gatherers of the previous “thought experiment”
in a very crowded space. Actually, this threat is in the radar of people concerned with electrical and
electronic systems resilience in the event of space storms [10,11].
The ”thought experiment” of supposing that instantly some swath of technical systems disappears
irremediably allows one to get, at least, an idea of the technical depth of the STS with respect to the
swath disappeared. Two questions arise: how many people would die? How backwards in technology
and equipment would go the survivors?
The same technique can be used to get an idea of the social depth of the STS. If people would
change instantly some swath of behaviors what would be the consequences?
The situation we experience today is the STSs we live in are immensely deeper with respect
to hunter-gatherers. An exceptional space storm or solar eruption that could be catastrophic for us
would do no special harm to them. Depth comes not only from the technical systems that produce life
conditions for most people being prone to disruption. Our STS are weaponized STS. This means that lots
of socio-technical subsystems, armies and armed groups, stand ready to destroy productive technical
systems—and people. As a third factor, we can add that as the complexity of the system grows it is to
expect that we lose prediction capability: more unforeseen failures could stay unforeseen and happen.
2.1.1. Socio-Technical Subsystems and Their Frontiers
It is a useful common practice to divide a system into subsystems. The distinction of subsystems
inside a system can result in collections of subsystems that overlap or do not overlap. If we divide the
hardware of a computer into subsystems, we end up with a collection of subsystems that does not
overlap. Technically, one says that we made a partition of the system because no two subsystems have
elements in common.
That may not be the case with STSs. An STS can be divided in subsystems and many of them
will be overlapping. Let us assume that the whole human species and its accompanying technical
paraphernalia constitute the global STS. Now consider a division of the global STS in subsystems, each
subsystem being a state. States define a partition of the global STS in what respects terrestrial surfaces
(taking out disputed lands), but only a quasi-partition in what respects people because some people
are citizens of two or more states.
Now, let us consider organizations, as socio-technical subsystems of the global STS, for example,
multi-national corporations, or inter-national organizations. It is clear that these subsystems overlap
with the subsystems that we call states.
Other subsystems can be considered along other criteria. Spoken languages define subsystems
of the global STS. Speakers of a given language define the social component of a subsystem and the
technical means necessary for the use, preservation and evolution of the language define the technical
component. We can note that languages define a quasi-partition of the global STS because some people
speak several languages and therefore participate in more than one linguistic community. Again, we
see that linguistic subsystems overlap with the subsystems states and organizations.
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The same could be said of religions, of cultures in general and of professional activities. Religions
stress the spiritual side of humans, but it is clear that they rely on technical artifacts, as buildings and
communication devices like books and imagery. So, in fact, a religion is a socio-technical subsystem
of the global STS. Cultures also constitute subsystems of the global STS and the same can be said of
professional activities. There is a social dimension in being a scientist, an engineer or a physician, as
there is a technical dimension. Moreover, in these (and other) cases, there is a character of necessity in
the referred subsystems. If we imagine that all the scientists with their labs would magically disappear,
or all the engineer and their devices, or all the physicians and other personnel and medical equipment,
then other people in the global STS would be in (dire) difficulties.
In summary, in the global STS (and possibly in many STSs), we can distinguish many subsystems
according to several criteria. A criterion will generate partitions or quasi-partitions of the STS. Different
criteria will generate overlapping subsystems. In this way, we can explore the inner structures of STSs
and their connections.
2.2. Resilience as Dealing with Failure
The increasing depth—size and complexity—of the STSs we live in increases their vulnerability.
It also requires a theory to deal with disturbance compensation or, more generally, system failure, well
beyond the classical approaches of control or reliability and safety. The word “resilience” has been a
catalyst in the search and realization of such a theory and in practical initiatives [12,13].
Several meanings can be assigned to resilience and are discussed in the literature [14–25]. The
approach taken here is they represent legitimate concerns prompted by the increasing depth and
vulnerability of STSs. The idea that emerges is that there are many interesting and useful concepts that
could be bound together to a property of a system called “resilience”. It also emerges that this property
can be the object of engineering design or maintenance and that resilience engineering [15,20,21,23] is
now conceived as a proper engineering field.
In this paper, one assumes the following working definition: resilience is the property of an STS
that avoids possible failures and minimizes bad outcomes for people when failures that were not
avoided happen.
Recognizing as [15] that failures are unavoidable, resilience and resilience engineering is seen
dealing with failure on a continued basis at whichever width of a system one may be interested.
This definition is agnostic with respect to the structural, parametric or functional changes that must
happen to increase resilience. For example, [25] distinguishes between resilience as (the probability of)
persistence in time and relative stability as the property of a system state to come back to an attractor
after a disturbance. The authors in [24] distinguish between resilience and resistance, understood as
some kind of “mechanical” opposition to a threat. The reasoning I follow here is as follows.
An STS must have a simultaneously centralized and distributed process to deal with failures.
An STS that is better than another to deal with failures (of some kind) will be more resilient, or present
greater resilience. Depending on the type of threat, the actions taken by the “dealing with failure”
process can be of different types, as increasing relative stability margins, increasing shields, structurally
transforming a subsystem to keep its functionality or any other. Therefore, no limit is previously
assumed on how much the system may transform or which can be the actions taken.
Failures can be provoked or triggered by external or internal factors of an STS. Whatever the cause,
the pattern of operation dealing with failure appears as invariant and presents three main functions.
With regard to controllability, failures can be classified as avoidable or unavoidable. This gives
the basic strategy for resilience: avoid avoidable failures and have recovery or adaptation processes
prepared for not avoided ones.
With regard to knowledge, a failure can be unknown, predictable or experienced. Unknown
failures are failures from which we know only that we cannot rule out existence in a very basic footing.
Unknown failures are those that we do not know what they could be, but that we assume cautiously
that they may manifest.
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Depending on the consequences, when an unknown failure happens for the first time, the system
may breakdown or not, but, truly, there is not much one can engineer in such a situation, except on
an ad hoc basis. The system will react with whatever available resources and skills it can deploy and
coordinate after the failure to counter its consequences. This reaction must proceed with knowledge
that results from the failure having happened, because from a logical point of view, one cannot prepare
a counter-measure to a threat that one knows nothing about. Therefore, we turn our attention to
predictable failures, failures that one can assign a degree of making something meaningfully greater
than zero, because we know something about them.
Note that there is a connection between avoidable and avoided failures and prediction.
An avoidable failure can only be avoided if predicted. Therefore, a resilient system will invest a
fraction of its energy and knowledge to search for predictable failures that did not happen yet. In
addition, it will invest another fraction in developing counter-measures as avoidance, recovery or
adaptation processes for predictable failures.
Predictable failures may have been experienced or not. In the first case, there are good chances
that recovery processes for them are being bettered and, if the failure is avoidable, that avoidance
processes are in operation.
Predictable but not experienced or under-documented failures may or may not enjoy due attention
for avoidance, recovery or adaptation processes. This lack of attention may result in an economy
of effort, if the failure does not happen, or in catastrophic losses, if the failure happens and so are
the consequences.
The above reflections show that engineering resilience in STS includes three main functions:
prediction of failures, development and implementation of counter-measures, to which one adds
information and knowledge gathering from occurred failures.
On the Complexity of STSs
Socio-technical systems appear us as complex systems. The issue is relevant to system resilience,
at least on the grounds of our intuition that a more complex system has more and unpredictable ways
to fail than a less complex one. Yet, there is no agreed definition for system complexity [26]. People
working in the field associate several properties to a complex system. Here, I will take the meaning
given by Simon [27]: “Roughly, by a complex system I mean one made up of a large number of parts
that interact in a nonsimple way”.
In my perspective, two ideas associated to complexity are of special importance with regard to
resilience. First, one must consider the distinction between complication and complexity, signaled
by Rosen [28]. A complicated system has many parts, but they interact in a simple way. This has as
consequence that if we map the parts and their interactions, we will be able, in principle, to model and
predict the system behavior.
Second, one must consider that many complex systems are unpredictable in the “long” run.
Some nonsimple interactions, technically nonlinear interactions, imply that we should have infinite
information about the system’s state to make “long term” predictions. Because we can only get a finite
amount of information, even if we have a correct model, we are only able to make predictions for a
“short” time span. Systems with this property are said sensitive to initial conditions and exhibit chaotic
behavior or “chaos”. A well-known example is the weather.
In real systems, we find a mix of complication and nonlinear interactions leading to
unpredictability in variable proportions. Both affect resilience in different ways. Complication means
many elements. Having a great number of agents can be beneficial with regard to predictability: while
the behavior of an individual human being is quite unpredictable, the behavior of one million human
beings can be quite predictable. On the other hand, the existence of many elements means that one
must have the capacity to gather and interpret big amounts of data. Being unable to do so may have as
a result that failures will happen because real systems are both complicated and complex.
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Nonlinear interactions leading to unpredictability pose another problem. A minute deviation of
the actual system state from the perceived one can lead to a system’s behavior very different from the
anticipated one. This is metaphorically referred as the “butterfly effect”.
Now, it is possible to recognize that the design of technical artifacts and systems is predicated
on predictability. If a system does not behave as predicted (and desired), one speaks of failure. Most
of the work of engineers amounts to suppress or limit nonlinear interactions introducing chaotic or
unpredictable behavior in devices. Consider the device (computer or other) where you are reading this
paper. It is a hugely complicated system with billions of components, yet its behavior is predictable.
Actually, generations of engineers worked for such a result.
With regard to STSs, I observe again that they have a social or human component and a technical
component. Technical artifacts, if properly designed and maintained, should not pose the bigger
problem for resilience, but humans should do, for two reasons. One, humans are genuinely complex,
and two, we do not know enough about human social behavior.
To deal with complexity, the concept of “edge of chaos”, first spotted by Langton in
computation [29], can be useful. Generalizing the concept, we got the idea that life, and therefore
human societies, exist in a “tiny band” (the edge) between non-chaotic highly ordered systems
and chaotic systems. If human societies are pushed too much to the ordered side they will go
into sclerosis and eventually implode. If they are pushed too much to the chaotic side they will
eventually disintegrate.
2.3. People and Organizations
In reflecting about designing systemic engineering resiliency, we cannot focus only on the
functions referred above, prediction of failures, development of counter-measures, knowledge
gathering from occurred failure. Functions are going to be implemented by organizations of people.
We cannot forget who the real actors are and which are their sizes.
Socio-technical systems differ in the size of the system one wants to consider in the analysis. In this
paper, the vastest STS considered is the human species. Then, following a geographically contiguous
criterion, one could consider states and nations, regions and cities. Following a networked criterion
over the above one can consider businesses, non-profit organizations and public organizations. Some
organizations may be inter-national in that they can rule wider than states, according to some agreed
mechanism of decision.
We consider primary public organizations those that have the power to impose the payment of
taxes in a given territory in a designated currency. This makes states as the primary public organizations
to consider, with secondary organizations being inter-national organizations funded by states. Given
that states can be very large organizations, it is useful to consider a state as being decomposable in a
network of public organizations.
Private organizations cannot impose the payment of taxes. We use the label “non-profit” for those
that get funding through fees, donations or subsidies. We use the label “businesses” for those that that
get funding through selling something that others want to buy.
2.3.1. Monetary Coordination Structure of Global Civilization or the Global STS
The above usual classification of organizations into public ones, non-profits, and businesses, is
based on the relation of said organizations with money in a shallow view. Beneath these obvious
distinctions, lies a most important process of coordinating human behavior in any STS: the monetary
process of coordination. One can—and should—interpret money as a tool or artifact in a system that
coordinates people and organizations inside a state [30], and to some extent, that coordinates states
themselves. The use of money can be understood as exercising a technique for coordination in an
STS. To see this, one may use a “negative” thought experiment. Nowadays, most of money exists not
as “mechanical” paper notes or coins, but as electronic registers in computer systems that not only
“store” money but also process monetary transactions. Imagine that these systems would blow up
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during night. What would people do in the morning? How could they get the continuous coordination
necessary to produce and distribute things?
Let me try to give a quick sketch of how the coordination system using money as a tool works.
First, one observes that in developed—or developing—economies, a crucial number of things that
people need can only be accessed by buying them, so, people need to earn money. This can only be done
by participating in a public or private organization. Public organizations, at least in a nominal sense,
have the charter of realizing some social useful function. The same applies to private organizations
(I am not taking in account illegal or criminal activities and organizations). In the case of businesses,
the usefulness of their function is directly measured through sales exceeding costs. Nominally, this
leads people to coordinate their behaviors in social useful ways.
It must be noted that states, or more exactly, governments, i.e., the legislative and executive
branches of a state, have a key role in the overall coordination process because they perform the
functions of decision making on top problems at the widest level for the state STS. The key role
comes from the fact that a government has the powers to keep armies and police forces, establish
laws or setting the basic operating rules for the society, enforce their observance and direct (at large
for the private sector, more strictly for the public one) the social and economic activity in its area of
jurisdiction. Among these powers, it is included the power of monopolistically issuing the currency each
state designates for the payment of taxes. Issuance of currency can be negative or positive. It is negative
when the government taxes because as a result people or private organizations are left with less money.
It is positive when the government spends because as a result people in public organizations and in the
private ones that sell products to the government are left with more money. The powers of selectively
spending and taxing, together with legislating, mean that governments have decisive tools to steer the
economies of their jurisdictions.
Now, for several reasons, the role of governments in the issuance of money and their
responsibilities in the overall coordination process are badly understood. We may consider another
thought experiment. Let us imagine that some government y, not being the government of state x,
would announce that would begin issuing currency named as the currency of state x. We can see that
this is not a possible move for government y. It would be considered a counterfeiter and possibly
give origin to a casus belli. This shows that as long as a state is considered a state by other states it has
the power of issuing its own currency and the correlated responsibility of managing issuance in the
generalized sense (spending and taxing) in the public interest of their citizens.
The three powers of legislating, spending and taxing make the government a key agent inside
an STS that we call a country. A government is as source of coordination for private and other public
organizations. Inside the physical resources of its country it can induce an economy of prosperity.
Business resiliency, in the bare sense of not becoming bankrupt or of bottom-line resilience, very much
depends on governmental decisions to induce prosperity. Therefore, we may expect that systemic
resilience at a global level very much depends on governments, their decisions and the level of
coordination that they can achieve among them and with other organizations. This is investigated in
the sequel, with regard to major global threats.
We must note that the above description of organizations and their relations implicitly assumes
that all people in all organizations are reasonably benevolent towards other people. In this view,
problems with resilience, as any other problems, would result mainly from ignorance or unawareness.
This is not true: not all people are benevolent for all people all the time and some are malevolent all the
time. In coordination and cooperation studies, the first ones are usually called cooperators and the last
ones are called defeaters. This last group is the most dangerous for an STS because malevolency will
result in a continuous tension to trigger failures in the STS. This is an unsolved problem for resilience
engineering of STS. One should remember that we are dealing with socio-technical systems, systems
with a necessary social component; therefore, social behavior becomes necessarily a factor to consider
in engineering.
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The approach taken here is to assume that most people in organizations are reasonably benevolent;
therefore, they are cooperators and see what becomes required in the cases under study. In this
approach, defeaters are treated as an uncompensated perturbation at any level of an STS. In Section 4,
a sketch for a theory of social dynamics is being presented that will allow a more direct consideration
of defeaters.
2.3.2. Prosperity in the Global STS as a Standard of Quality for Societies
In the introduction, I made the case that prosperity of societies is a necessary condition for
bottom-line business resilience in general. It is appropriate to hint, or better, stress, that in the
conceptualization of societies as STSs prosperity does not appear as some unattainable condition or
as a condition subject to unknowable and uncontrollable destructive forces—as one could be led to
believe just by hearing or reading what is mostly said and written.
Let us consider some facts. Taking the Industrial Revolution as a, somehow arbitrary, departing
point in a time interval going to nowadays, it is clear that the application of science and technology
to the production of artifacts, devices and systems had as a consequence a huge positive leap in the
human experience manifested in the expectation of life duration and quality of life for most people.
Such an increase had a cost in resources, but this cost is manageable. So, science and technology are
and will be here to create and sustain the material basis of prosperity. Disregarding some doubts on
getting clean energy in the amounts needed, it is therefore clear that lack of prosperity, at the global
level, is not caused by technological shortcomings.
The question can be more concretely posed at the level of a state STS. As an STS it has two
components, social and technical. The citizens of the state STS, their productive knowledge and
organizational capabilities, together with the technical equipment and natural resources controlled
by the STS define an envelope of real possibilities on which a plan to attain prosperity must be based.
As of now, it appears that no state STS is self-sufficient, so a plan to attain prosperity must also rely on
international cooperation, beginning with trade. Should such plans be adopted by a critical number
of countries, a global phase shift to prosperity is possible, because at the planetary level the required
initial knowledge and equipment exists together with all the natural resources.
The hallmark of such plans is being inclusive and realistic. Actually, they are not difficult to
devise. They result from applying scientific reasoning to known data, the application being grounded
on an ethical choice and a pragmatic view. The ethical choice requires that one includes all humans in
the category of human beings where one puts oneself. The pragmatic view acknowledges that humans
have limitations and operate under several constraints that block the transition to global prosperity.
It appears to me that a promising way to resolve the tension between the possibility of global
prosperity and its antagonist factors is indicated by the idea of interpreting prosperity in an STS as said
STS realizing a standard of quality for the human society it embodies. The standard of quality defines the
target prosperity with regard to the envelope of real possibilities. The word realization reminds us that
such standard of quality will not happen by decree but by tenacious work, civic compromise, interplay
and cooperation of public and private organizations.
3. Business Resilience and its External Global Dimension
3.1. The Resilience of Businesses
3.1.1. What is a Business?
We are now in a position to think business resilience in the socio-technical terms developed above.
In a modern STS, coordination of productive activity occurs through a process that has money as the
key device. Nominally or ideally speaking, people must earn money to get what they want or desire and
they can do this only by coordinating activity with others so that the production of useful things for
people results.
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Businesses constitute a type of organizations that work under the following constraint: proceeds
of sales must equal payments made along a time average. Coupling this constraint with a “competitive
market” makes businesses align their products to the preferences of buyers. To the extent that a market
is competitive and fairly regulated this arrangement has shown effective to structure the socio-technical
production of “marketable” goods and services—for a negative example, one can take the the Soviet
Union and its spectacular collapse.
Yet, buyers are not the only stakeholders of businesses. Participants in businesses also are
stakeholders. Participation in a business can follow two schemes: partnership-only or partnership
plus the employer-employee relation. Theoretically, the partnership-only scheme is more efficient
to satisfy interests of both buyers and participants. In practice, it represents only a small fraction
of businesses. The partnership (of employers) plus the employer-employee relation represent the
vast majority of businesses. This scheme has an inherent conflict of interests: it is in the interest of
employers to maximize the productive effort obtained by paid compensation, while the opposite is
true for employees.
The inherent problem in the employer-employee scheme has been overcome, better or worse,
by the simple fact that most people (either employers or employees) are benevolent and adapt
behavior, besides governments enacting legislation that alleviates the negative social impacts of
the scheme. At first sight, the differences between the two schemes do not preclude a common theory
of business resilience.
3.1.2. The Resilience Process in Business
A business is an STS that is a subsystem of a larger system (or several larger systems). It is
potentially subject to failures. Failures can have an internal cause, an external cause or a mix of the two.
The resilience process of a business must perform the three functions referred above: predict possible
failures, develop counter-measures to possible failures and gather information. Because failures can
have internal and external factors, they must be addressed in two directions: one internal, the other
external. We can think the resilience process of a business as having two (sub)processes. The internal
process will target actions for avoidance and response to threats that only depend on the capacities of
the business. In contrast, the external process will target actions to influence the environment where
the business operates.
So, let us say that a business aims to become more resilient with regard to terrorist attacks.
The internal resilience process will address the operational procedures that can make the business
minimize the losses and recover faster after such an event. The external resilience process will target to
influence the government to deploy a more effective protection (short term) or influence governments
in general to enter a pacification process (medium to long term).
Or, let us consider the “eternal” threat of the business’ bottom line going into the red. The internal
resilience process will address costs and efficiency of operations. The external resilience process
may select to do an advertising campaign (short term) or influence governments to increase society’s
prosperity (long term).
There are many possibilities to conceive the operation of the external resilience process and
many possible choices of which threats to address. In the following section, I consider two threats
that are top-level in the sense of threatening the continuity of the global STS. They are threats for
businesses—and for people in general—therefore they should be targets for action in the external
resilience process of any business.
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3.2. Two Major Threats to the Global STS
3.2.1. The Case of Nuclear War
Political events of the last years raised the perceived risk of a nuclear war. According to recent
research [31,32], the prediction is still the same of the “old” research: the ensuing nuclear winter would
wipe off civilization, if not the whole human species.
It is clear that such an event would be the “supreme” failure that the STS we live in could undergo:
a kind of suicidal act. Let us note that the threat for this failure comes potentially not only from conflict
among nuclear powers, but also from technical failures on monitoring radars [33].
Conceivably, what could increase the probability of avoiding such a complete failure? It seems
more or less clear that the majority of businesses and people working in them, producing goods
and services, are interested in a generalized climate of peace, one that would minimize the risk of
war, including nuclear war, and maximize opportunities of useful and profitable deals. Taking in
account that not all businesses are of such interest and not all people are benevolent in general, the
question is how those that do can influence public organizations, deciding on peace and war, to choose
peace-enabling policies?
The solution for this problem can be deemed conceptually simple: the major military powers
decision makers must recognize the futility of being able to wage war unless in self-defense. It makes
little sense to be able to grab territory and resources in a civilization that disappears. The logic of
nuclear dissuasion is that nuclear weapons should never be used. This logic very much applies to
other military equipment. If this is so, it must benefit people in general a lot to reduce the cost of
keeping and developing equipment that should never be used.
In this perspective, the actual military and industrial units should be redeployed for self-defense,
systemic resilience or even businesses like sport spectacles and games. Note that for all countries, as
for all people, the capability of self-defense should not be abandoned because the probability of threats
that require it cannot be set to zero.
A proposal for a realignment of attitudes with peace as first factor and the reconversion of the
risky and useless war units into self-defense, resilience and peaceful business units should not be
presented alone. If there is a risk of civilization collapse by other reasons other than war, self-defense
becoming war may very well happen after all. If civilization goes towards collapse by the reasons
indicated in the next section, armed conflicts will ensue because resources will become critically scarce
or social cohesion will go below critical levels.
3.2.2. The Case of Civilization Collapse
Historical collapses of civilizations have been recently analyzed and modeled. According to [34]:
“Virtually every past civilization has eventually undergone collapse, a loss of socio-political-economic
complexity usually accompanied by a dramatic decline in population size.”
These collapses have been regional. The question that one poses now is if our global civilization
(or global STS in this paper terminology) or some swath of it will also collapse?
In [35] a classical analysis of the possible causes of civilization collapse is made. Here, I follow
a theoretical model proposed in [3]. The authors consider two factors for collapse: depletion of
natural resources and wealth stratification of population into “commoners” and “elites”. The model is
able to reproduce qualitatively dynamics of historical collapses. The annoying—or alerting—aspect
of this model is the so-called “developed countries” show both signals. Beyond consumption of
resources above the carrying capacity, in the last decades they present increased widening of income
and wealth distribution, with a decreasing share for “commoners”, labor conditions worsened and
increasing unemployment.
One may signal that some businesses with particularly humanist and creative leaders have
attained interesting results with regard to inclusive policies that counter wealth stratification. Yet,
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the fact stays that unless the business is a monopoly, it operates in a competitive market. As referred
above, market competition has some advantages for buyers, like increased attention of businesses to
their wishes, but it also has some hidden and strong disadvantages unless public government sets
appropriate rules of the game. A general “rule of the game” for businesses is that they will not pay
for something unless they are obliged to. Without adequate public governance, this will mean that, in
general, an environmental and social responsible entrepreneur will go with the competition or will go
out of business.
As well for employment it is very little appreciated that under the rules of market competition
businesses are not geared to employ people; they are geared toward dis-employing people. Against, this
has nothing to do with the benevolence of management but with the bare fact that a business cannot
stay much time in the red whichever is the cause.
This “race to the bottom“ extends to economic relations among countries. Again, the
institutionalized decision that can make a difference is in the hands of public organizations responsible
for public government, because governments are the agents that can contract inter-national economic
relations among countries that are win-win, in the sense of being profitable for the vast majorities of
their populations.
In a sense, the wealth stratification factor appears easier to tackle than resource depletion because
theoretically it appears mainly as a social factor. It has become common practice to require that
technical artifacts and systems comply with quality standards. The idea can be extended to STSs.
Given that we are considering human societies as STSs, I propose that a minimal standard of quality for
societies should be deployed similarly to the existing standards for technical-only components.
While this may seem farfetched and quite difficult at first sight, I further suggest that a document
embodying such a standard already exists as the Declaration of Human Rights (DHR) from the United
Nations (UN) [36]. Realizing a minimal standard of life for all citizens should eliminate or limit
the effects of wealth stratification. This can be done by a coordinated global action of governments
and other public organizations, non-profits and businesses. The major countries—or socio-technical
subsystems—should have here (as in the case of peace) a role of persuasion by example. I remember
that prosperity leads to increased demand and adequate demand for a business’s products is key to
their resilience.
The seemingly more difficult part with this approach comes from the implied resource depletion
side. Life, at any standard of quality, requires energy and most of energy we need [37] comes from
combustibles. This sources carbon dioxide into the atmosphere that is not sunk and global warming
ensues with high probability of very dangerous effects [38]. The effects of global warming include a
reduction of livable territories areas [39] with mass migrations upsetting the equilibrium obtained among
nations in what respects occupied territory. Therefore, by sourcing energy mostly from combustibles
we are depleting down to very dangerous levels a critical resource of our and any civilization: space
for people to live and produce the things required for their life.
For the warming to stop, we must stop sourcing carbon dioxide or we must sink it out, otherwise
the “allowable thermal point of operation” of the STS we live in will be exceeded. For our civilization
to continue we should do both: develop technologies for substituting combustibles as energy
sources and for sinking or “sequestrating” carbon dioxide. Rather than cooperating for these first
priority goals, states are conflicting about questions that literally will evaporate if global warming
continues unchecked.
Although, by law, businesses have no direct intervention in government, they surely can have
a catalyzing role of public opinion and the possibility to strongly argue the need for and influence
governments to take policies addressing these general issues of continuity for the global STS. On this
matter, I would call again the attention of the reader to a report that I present as a case study in Box 2.
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A case study of case studies: A sample of how companies see governmental action in building resilience.
Will businesses come to require and influence governments to tackle the global issues in business resilience
raised in this paper?
The National Round Table on The Environment and Economy of Canada produced several reports. One of
them (available here: http://neia.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/cp5-case-studies.pdf [40]), “Facing the
Elements: Building Business Resilience in a Changing Climate (Case Studies)”, documents the approaches for
increasing resilience to climate change taken by thirteen companies operating in Canada. The documentation
covered the same items for all companies and one of them was the perspective on government roles held
by companies.
Going through all the thirteen perspectives, it becomes clear that companies expect governments to take due
diligence and action in public matters, including legislation, research, advance information and education. They
also show willingness to cooperate with governments and display understanding that some problems cannot be
solved without cooperation.
It turns out that companies are committed to increase their resilience and distinguish clearly what should be
done by governments, by themselves and in cooperation.
I conclude that the question is fundamentally one of awareness. Twenty years ago, a report as this one
would be near to unthinkable. It is to expect that a raising awareness of business resilience depending on actions
targeting global problems will raise the requirements of businesses with regard to governments’ decisions.
Box 2. A case study of case studies: how thirteen companies operating in Canada described their views
of what governmental action should be in building resilience to climate change.
4. The Network of Human Groups under Organizations
Differently from all other we know, we are technical animals. We use tools. With tools we keep
us alive. With tools we enslave or kill other humans. The more one tests the concept, the more
one sees that one cannot dissociate being technical from being human. In a sense, many animals are
technical in that they exhibit complex and intelligent behaviors producing the results they need. But we
only use consistently objects as tools, so maybe it is more correct to say that we are instrumentally
technical animals.
This “technicality” could not have evolved without us being social animals. We discovered a
very advantageous general process: pass to the next generation the techniques and equipment created.
This process could have been very slow at beginning, but accelerated whenever civilizations emerged.
From the birth of science in Europe, in a crescent pace of growth, the process attained the actual levels
of knowledge and technology. Human societies are socio-technical systems.
How wondering can be some realizations of present day science, technology and our STSs,
we must not forget that a dark side of it exists. Europeans disseminated the foundations of modern
science and technology in the globe, together with colonization, genocide, enslavement, war and
exploitation. While globally the social and inter-national situation has been ameliorating, the fact
remains that if we take the full realization of UN DHR as a standard of quality for STSs, only a few
countries (if any!) will pass the test. We can connect this to the fact that our STSs continue exposed to
the threats of nuclear war or civilization collapse, as pointed in the last section. So, despite the realized
technological feats, we must acknowledge that our STSs are still of a quite rude or primitive level as
they still did not manage to implement credible counter-measures for the pointed threats.
Let us take the question of existence of more advanced STSs in abstract—as we do not know any
other except our own. It is conceivable that such more advanced STSs should have realized minimal
quality standards of life and made them sustainable by avoiding the threats above. If besides being
conceivable, such STSs are possible, there must exist a path from an STS as ours to an advanced STS.
Some components of such path may be technical as developing usable sources of energy without
the problems entailed by combustibles. However, the simple fact that efforts in such direction are not
first priority in the inter-national coordination of states shows us that the social components must
be investigated.
Our classification of organizations as public and private, non-profit or business is a standard one in
the reference frame adopted. This frame supposes monetized national economies with property rights,
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supported and generally directed by states that enforce law and provide public services. Another
assumption we took was that most people in organizations are reasonably benevolent.
These assumptions appear unsatisfactory to explain the observed behavior of our STSs. If there
is a possibility that a successful large-scale cooperation towards resilience of the global STS may
emerge, better models for analysis must exist and we should discover them. Here we will propose the
following hypothesis.
Human social dynamics is determined, at the social realm, by the cooperation and conflict of the
several (or many!) overlapping groups that form naturally in the human species.
As examples of such groups one can point out that humans group themselves naturally: by
gender and by age; by geographical distance, genetics and cultures forming nations; by choice of
fundamental descriptions of reality forming religions; by “chunks” of Earth surface, forming states,
and by ethical choices and cognitive levels forming groups with a kind of collective intelligence that
serves the choices and operates within the cognitive level.
The last type of groups is of special interest. Above, I suggested that “economic prosperity”
plans must be based on an inclusive ethical stance that puts all human beings in the same category as
oneself. Yet, on a realistic perspective, taking such stance will not be often the case. Rather, one can
observe a spectrum that goes from the benign case where one cares about the others as a function of
perceived proximity (of family, of community, of country) to the case where individuals or groups of
individuals consider most of other people as objects proper to be exploited, killed, enslaved or any
other malevolency that may satisfy personal or group greed or result from ignorance, prejudice or
herd behavior.
It follows that human social behavior exists in a spectrum that, from the perspective of an STS, can
go from an extreme of cooperation to an extreme of “anti-cooperation”. For “anti-cooperation” I mean
a behavior that is coordinated and has as result the worsening of living conditions and resilience. It is
clear that an advanced STS requires a level of cooperation geared towards resilience, and therefore a
level of “anti-cooperation” inhibition, substantially greater than it exists in most of our STSs.
A practical implication of the hypothesis is the following. To assess the possibilities of cooperation
among organizations one should begin by determining who are the relevant decision-makers in the
organizations and in which “deep” groups they position themselves, in particular with respect to the
cooperation versus “anti-cooperation” spectrum.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, I have followed a dimension of systemic analysis of interest for business resilience
proposed by the author of [1]: shouldn’t businesses care first for global systemic resilience rather than
business resilience?
As I have argued in the introduction, the question does not pose itself in terms of “rather than”.
Global systemic resilience is of direct and immediate interest to business resilience. Properly seen,
it appears unavoidable that businesses must address resilience through a process targeting internal
factors and a twin process for targeting external factors. In the sequel, I have developed this concept of
resilience having an “environment targeting arm” and I argued that addressing top-level threats for
the global STS should continuously be in the action program of this “arm”.
To this aim, I conceptualized human societies and the human species as STSs. Resilience was
understood as an engineering function of an STS directed to deal with failures, under conditions of
system complexity. This function includes prediction and avoidance of large-scale failures. Following
this, I presented a model for the relations of organizations in an STS based on the concept of money
being the tool for a global coordination of activity.
Upon the above concepts, I indicated a characterization of businesses as subsystems of larger
STSs in connection with the coordination mechanism above. Taking seriously the idea that business
resilience should be taken by two “arms”, I have proposed that the “external arm” should include the
addressing of two main threats to the global STS: nuclear war and civilization collapse induced by
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simultaneous wealth stratification and resource depletion. Possible counter-measures were advanced,
respectively, reconceptualization of the systemic role of military units, realizing a minimal standard
of quality in societies, viz., the UN DHR, and investing heavily in developing usable substitutes of
combustibles as energy sources.
While the logical thing to do for businesses is to influence and cooperate with public opinion and
governments towards a process of contention of such threats, I advanced the hypothesis that sectorial
interest groups can capture governments—and organizations in general—or constrain them to act on
their behalf, actually blocking, delaying or making such processes difficult. Global systemic resilience
can be advanced commensurately with the extent that governments can take systemically cooperative
behaviors and social groups allow or press them. This, as already noted, will require the cooperation
and interplay of all concerned citizens and organizations in the global STS for which businesses can
behave as a catalyzing force through their resilience programs.
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